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Introduction 
Veteran CIA officer Anonymous[2] continues where he left off in Through Our Enemies' Eyes[3], arguing 
that Osama bin Laden is not a terrorist but rather the leader of a global Islamic jihad aimed, determined 
not to topple America or its way of life, but to achieve limited foreign policy objectives. He contends that 
our leaders are blinded by what he terms imperial hubris, "interpreting the world so it makes sense to us, 
a process yielding a world in which few events seems alien because we Americanize their components 
(165)." Senior members of the military and intelligence bureaucracies, academics, and media 
commentators are "locked behind an impenetrable wall of political correctness and moral cowardice" and 
"act as naïve and arrogant cheerleaders for the universal applicability of Western values (xvi)." Given the 
scope of the threat and the powerful, religiously inspired resolve of the enemy, we are consigned to 
defeat unless we recognize that "most of the world outside North America is not, does not want to be, and 
probably will never be just like us (167)." 
 
Perhaps the most important failing resulting from this hubris, Anonymous argues, is the continued 
insistence that we are not at war with Islam but rather at war with only a few extremist madmen. He sees 
this is done partly out of genuine ignorance about the outside world but also as a function of "political 
correctness" and "fear of being labeled a racist or bigot (115)," both of which preclude honest debate. 
Regardless of the cause for this blindness, he believes that, while Americans do not perceive themselves 
to be waging war on Islam, bin Laden has convinced a very large segment of the Muslim world that it is 
their moral duty to wage a "defensive jihad" to protect their way of life from "Crusaders."  
 
Anonymous argues that in most of our dealings with the Middle East, our leaders—including senior 
intelligence and foreign policy bureaucrats—are failing to "exploit the checkables (22, 83)." That is, they 
are ignoring the obvious lessons of history, failing to learn from past operational successes and failures, 
or even to take seriously the repeated written statements of bin Laden and others spelling out the reasons 
they are fighting. Specifically, bin Laden has six "clear, focused, limited, and widely popular" goals, which 
he has stated repeatedly since 1998: 
· The end of U.S. aid to Israel and the ultimate elimination of that state;  
· The removal of U.S. and Western forces from the Arabian peninsula;  
· The removal of U.S. and Western military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other 
Muslim lands;  
· The end of U.S. support for the oppression of Muslims by Russia, China, and India;  
· The end of U.S. protection for repressive, apostate Muslim regimes in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, et cetera;  
· The conservation of the Muslim world's energy resource and their sale at higher prices. 
(210) 
Because of our policies, most Muslims distrust the United States and there is very little we can do in the 
near term to persuade them of our good intentions. 
Cowardly Bureaucrats 
The author is dismissive of virtually every person and organization involved in U.S. national security 
policy, save for the lower ranked personnel—especially, for reasons not quite specified, the female 
officers—in the CIA's Directorate of Operations and the United States Marine Corps. His sheer contempt 
for those above him in the decision-making process or who arrive at different conclusions is exemplified 
by this sentence: "Beyond lieutenant colonel, however, things look iffy, and at the rank of brigadier 
general and above we find a disaster manned by senior officers, mostly men, who tack as needed to 
protect their careers and their institution's insiders club (177)." The book is replete with snide references 
along those lines: "lame U.S. and Western analytic corps and militaries (69);" "moral-cowardice-driven 
careerism (84);" "few senior bureaucrats will discount a threat if there is a one-in-a-billion chance it might 
occur and cost a promotion (84);" "terminally adolescent bureaucrats (85);" "careerism and moral 
cowardice that appear endemic in our general officer corps (178);" "only a dunce or a man ready to be 
silent to protect his career (182);" "frothing at the mouth Iraq experts(182);" "ill informed (203);" 
"dependable moral cowardice of my generation (216);" and "well-dressed, articulate, and politically 
sensitive dilettantes (245)." 
 
He echoes a lament common to those frustrated by the politics of climbing bureaucracy, such as Ralph 
Peters and David Hackworth, men whom he quotes frequently in the book:  
Expertise is a career killer, especially in the intelligence community. Most prized is the 
"generalist," the officer who changes jobs ever two years, flitting from Europe to East 
Asia to arms control to narcotics. Conversant in many topics, expert in none, these 
usually male officers are fast tracked for senior management (245). 
By contrast, as in his previous book, Anonymous is quite effusive in his praise of Osama bin Laden, 
comparing him favorably to Robert E. Lee (19, 60) and other American cultural icons.  
· Viewed from any angle, Osama bin Laden is a great man, one who smashed the 
expected unfolding of universal post-Cold War peace (103). 
· For nearly a decade now, bin Laden has demonstrated patience, brilliant planning, 
managerial expertise, sound strategic and tactical sense, admirable character traits, 
eloquence, and focused, limited war aims (114). 
· Well-spoken, kind, considerate, pious, and humble, bin Laden also killed more than 
three thousand Americans on 11 September 2001, and with that act-defying the mighty in 
deed as well as word-completed the composite picture of a classical Islamic hero (123). 
· [T]here is no reason, based on the information at hand, to believe bin Laden is anything 
other than what he appears: a pious, charismatic, gentle, generous, talented, and 
personally courageous Muslim who is blessed with sound strategic and tactical judgment, 
able lieutenants, a reluctant but indispensable bloody-mindedness, and extraordinary 
patience (168). 
One would be tempted to conclude Anonymous had "gone native," except that he is "a career-long 
'headquarters' officer (ix)." In fact, the author is merely trying to convey the deep and widespread respect 
that bin Laden has earned in the Muslim world and that, by dismissing him as a mere "terrorist," we 
grossly underestimate him. Unfortunately, as in his previous book, he occasionally writes in the voice of 
the enemy and obscures this. The use of words like "kind" and "pious" to describe the mastermind of the 
mass murder of thousands of civilians is incongruous at best and quite likely diminishes the author's 
credibility with his Western readers. This is a shame because he makes a fundamentally important point:  
What the West sees as tragic brutality practiced by despairing or deviant individuals is 
perceived in much of the Muslim world as a heroic act of self-sacrifice, patriotism, and 
worship, an act to be greeted not with condemnation and revulsion, but with awe, 
respect, and a determination to emulate (135). 
While many Islamic leaders condemn terrorist tactics, many others consider them a reasonable recourse 
and much more of the rank and file than our leaders want us to believe.  
Losing the War on Terror 
Anonymous argues that the United States is losing the war on terrorism, largely because we think we are 
fighting 1970s-style state sponsored terrorists rather than a loosely coordinated Islamic jihad. Because 
terrorism is fundamentally a criminal activity, we have always treated it as a matter of law enforcement, 
with offensive military and paramilitary operations relegated to sideshow status. Despite rhetoric on the 
part of the Bush administration that this has changed since 9/11, the author strongly believes otherwise. 
 
He finds it inexcusable that we were not prepared to launch a massive strike on al Qaeda's bases in 
Afghanistan within hours of the 9/11 attacks. He notes that there had been "six major al Qaeda victories" 
before 9/11[4], most recently the attack on the USS Cole, giving us ample warning, and that "numerous 
journalists and even John Walker Lindh" were able to find him. 
Washington's failure to have its military ready for a crippling, next-day attack on al Qaeda 
turned into a catastrophe. It cost America its best-and perhaps only-chance to deliver 
what is called a "decapitation" operation, one with a chance to kill at a stroke many al 
Qaeda and Taliban[5] leaders. . . . America probably lost the war against al Qaeda on 11 
September because the U.S. military had been caught completely unprepared (24-25). 
The reason for this delay, he charges, was entirely political. It was not that we lacked sufficient 
intelligence to conduct an operation, but rather the law enforcement mentality and the resulting need to 
have irrefutable evidence that al Qaeda was the culprit; an obsession with garnering international support 
for the operation; and a desire to launch a strike without killing innocent Afghans all tied our hands until it 
was too late.  
 
When action finally came, Anonymous believes, it was action that gave the appearance of victory to 
reporters and a public that had no way of knowing any better. However, in reality, the actions taken by 
American forces in Afghanistan against al Qaeda simply returned the Taliban to its more natural insurgent 
role. He argues further that various claims that the United States wasted a treasure trove of human 
intelligence in Afghanistan, namely, failing to utilize the "multiple hundreds" of skilled professionals that 
had been in that country for decades as a result of the 1979 Soviet invasion. "And the thing these 
American experts knew best and above all others was that there was no possibility of installing a broad-
based, Western-style, democratic, power-sharing central government in Kabul (29)."  
The operation was further botched, in his view, because it was managed by diplomatic bureaucrats who 
themselves were guilty of imperial hubris: 
Having banished these unwashed, medieval Islamists to the periphery of politics, the 
diplomats intended to give the bulk of the new government's post and power to people 
more like themselves: secularized Afghans; westernized Afghans who refused to fight for 
their country and spent a comfortable, self-imposed exile in Europe, India, or the United 
States. . . . As always for Western diplomats, well-coifed men who dressed well, spoke a 
smattering of English or French, and shared an aggressive contempt for region, were 
preferable as rulers to hirsute men wearing funny looking pajama-style clothes who had 
merely fought and defeated a mass-murdering, superpower enemy in a ten-year war. 
Style over credibility every time (39). 
He predicts that it is only a matter of time before the Taliban returns to power, since they—not the 
secularists whom the media focused on after the regime was toppled—represent the will of the Afghan 
people. Because the press, too, is guilty of imperial hubris, they are unable to see that most of the Islamic 
world is actually devoutly religious and does not equate modern Western values with "freedom." 
Anonymous derides press coverage of Afghanistan generally, noting that it was largely uncovered except 
for obsession with such things as "the failure of Taliban leaders to prove themselves radical feminists 
(143)." 
 
He saves his most bitter criticism for the launching of what he terms "an avaricious, premeditated, 
unprovoked war (xvii)" in Iraq.[6] Though a very small part of the book, this aspect has received the most 
attention in the early press, which is not surprising given the shock value of a sitting CIA officer criticizing 
an ongoing war. He entitled the section dealing with the war, "Iraq: The Hoped for but Never Expected 
Gift," and argues that there was virtually nothing the United States could have done that would have more 
predictably energized the Islamist insurgency. More importantly, it spread our resources too thin and left 
the business in Afghanistan half finished. 
While he notes that there have been numerous significant victories in the war against the jihadists, he 
believes them to be overmatched by victories on the other side. Further, he notes, we cannot even agree 
on how large the enemy force to be defeated is, much less possess an "order of battle" for al Qaeda (67-
68).  
 
As a result of these failures and others, "the war on terrorism has failed to defeat the main enemy, lost 
focus on national interests in favor of a quixotic attempt to democratize and secularize Islam, and is 
generating enemies and animosities faster than we can kill or quell them (215.)"  
American Way of War 
Anonymous observes that, though the United States has fought numerous military actions since 1990, 
"we have not once definitively and finally defeated the foe—military, paramilitary, or armed rabble—we 
defined as the foe. . . . We have seen no huge body counts, no stacking of arms, no formal surrenders, 
no masses of prisoners of war, and no tangible evidence of victory (170)." We have come to expect quick 
victory, with almost zero friendly casualties, and most incredibly with almost no damage to the enemy 
infrastructure or civilian population. He argues that this mindset virtually guarantees defeat against the 
Islamist insurgency we are now faced with. 
Given the nature of the enemy, he argues we can only prevail by achieving a decisive and bloody victory.  
Killing in large numbers is not enough to defeat our Muslim foes. With killing must come a 
Sherman-like razing of infrastructure. Roads and irrigation systems; bridges; power 
plants, and crops in the field; fertilizer plants and grain mills-all these and more will need 
to be destroyed to deny the enemy its support base. Land mines, moreover, will be 
massively reintroduced to seal borders and mountain passes too long, high, or numerous 
to close with U.S. soldiers (241). 
Not only must we go back to an older notion of warfare, we must also stop counting on international 
organizations for help in this war, given that it is the United States that is the prime target of the jihad. He 
believes not only that "others will not do our dirty work, but that others will stop us from doing our dirty 
work as completely as possible (243)."  
Prescriptions 
After noting that intelligence officers are engrained "from their first workday" never to make policy 
recommendations, Anonymous feels obliged to offer some given his substantial criticisms of the extant 
policies. Mostly, they revolve around the attitude of the American public and its leaders. Among them: 
· Relax. He argues that the constant clamoring about terrorist threats is both frightening 
and demoralizing the public with no tangible benefit. He shows particular scorn for the 
"indoor traffic signal" color-coded alert system. 
· Stop Celebrating Death and Defeat. He believes the constant, maudlin reflection on our 
casualties, particularly 9/11, is undignified.  
· Accept that We are Hated, Not Misunderstood. We are not defending "freedom" but our 
foreign policy interests. 
· Get Used to and Good at Killing. Quoting Ralph Peters, "We must avoid fantastic 
schemes to rescue those for whom we bear no responsibility….If we want to avoid the 
needless, thankless deaths of our own countrymen, we must learn to watch others die 
with equanimity (251)." 
· Professional Soldiers are Paid to Die. While he doesn't want to see American soldiers' 
lives "wasted," he argues that we are too afraid to have them risk their lives, which they 
have volunteered to do. He believes we must stop our "knee jerk yellow ribboning (243)" 
and constant calls for bringing troops home.  
In addition to a new attitude, he also proposes that we reconsider our foreign policy to make it less 
offensive to the Islamic world and to reform the bureaucracy to make it less conducive to careerism. 
Among these: 
· Do Not Deal with bin Laden as a Terrorist. We must fight a full-on military campaign, not 
a counter-terrorist intelligence battle. 
· Demand Energy Self-sufficiency. We must do whatever it takes to wean ourselves off 
Middle Eastern oil. Given that several of bin Laden's grievances are tied to our support of 
despotic regimes with which "we have nothing in common" and which we support only 
because of our "obsession with cheap oil," we could have a more rational Middle East 
policy with energy independence.  
· End the Fifth Column of Senior Military and Intelligence Retirees. He argues that the 
lure of lucrative private sector jobs after achieving a relatively early pension causes flag 
officers and senior bureaucrats to be even more afraid to speak their minds than would 
otherwise be the case. He proposes a ban on many such post-retirement jobs in 
exchange for longer careers after which they would retire with full pay and benefits. 
While not listed as a separate section in the final chapter, it is clear throughout the book that Anonymous 
is very critical of America's policies toward Israel, which he believes are almost reflexively pro-Israel. 
Evaluation 
As with any large undertaking, the book has several minor errors. For example, he repeats the oft-
repeated tale of the FBI assisting a "dead of night exodus" (24) of the bin Laden family after the 9/11 
attacks, which was finally put to rest by the report of the 9/11 Commission.[7] In fairness, the Commission 
report, while slightly beating this book on the shelves, came out weeks after it went to press. He lists 
Kosovo among a series of "half-started wars that will be refought later (178)." While it is certainly 
conceivable that war could break out again given that some underlying ethnic-border disputes are 
unresolved, the Milosovek regime was ousted from power and there is no indication that Serbian troops 
are likely to re-invade Kosovo.  
 
Regardless of whether one is persuaded by Anonymous' arguments with respect to how the war should 
be fought, it is hard to agree, even by his own standards, with assertions like this one: "Simply put, the 
enemy wants war and is not listening; he has no reason to listen, he is winning (253)." While he makes a 
powerful argument that the United States is no closer to defeating the Islamists than before 9/11 and may 
indeed be making things worse, wars are fought to achieve political objectives. As he notes, bin Laden 
has listed six of them. There is no evidence presented in this book that any political objectives are any 
closer to fruition. Indeed, U.S. sympathy for the Israeli cause vis-à-vis the Palestinian terrorists is higher 
than it has been in years; we have stopped condemning Russian atrocities in Chechnya and began 
buying their assertion that they are part of the war on terrorism; we are more tied than ever to Arab 
leaders who are willing to ally with us against the Islamists; and we have more forces in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq than we had before 9/11. It is true that we have drawn down forces in Saudi Arabia, although 
mainly to take the heat off the Saudi regime. Oil prices are up, although owing to increased demand from 
China and other factors rather than any policy changes. 
 
Anonymous is an intelligent, dedicated man who has spent his adult lifetime studying terrorism, Islamist 
radicalism, and Osama bin Laden. As such, his insights deserve attention. His core argument—that we 
are fighting against a large, Islamist jihad rather than a discrete terrorist organization—is quite compelling. 
Many of the conclusions that follow from that premise, while exceedingly frightening and anathema to the 
current mores of American political culture, should be debated. My fear is that the powerful arguments he 
marshals here will be largely dismissed because of the sneering tone and style. It will certainly be taken 
less seriously by the key decision makers whom he insults than it would have had he restrained his desire 
to vent his frustrations. 
 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights home 
page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each month, 
email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your address will be used 
for no other purpose. 
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